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WHEN LOSS OF LEGAL CUSTODY IS LIKE AN
INDETERMINATE PRISON SENTENCE: OHIO’S ELIMINATION
OF INDIGENT PARENTS’ RIGHT TO COURT APPOINTED
COUNSEL IN CIVIL CUSTODY SUITS
Renee Brunett*

“If permanent custody is the family law equivalent of the death
penalty in criminal cases, then legal custody is the equivalent of an
indeterminate prison sentence. An award of legal custody to a nonparent is a serious matter which cannot be taken lightly.”
—Hon. Mary DeGenaro, Presiding Judge, Ohio Court of Appeals,
Seventh District1
I. INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of Ohio exercises discretionary jurisdiction
over cases that raise substantial constitutional questions or issues of
“public or great general interest.”2 On June 25, 2014, the Supreme
Court of Ohio declined to review In re B.B., a juvenile court custody
case.3 Three justices dissented.4 Writing for the dissent, Justice
O’Neill trumpeted, “In no other situation has this court ever held that
a fundamental constitutional right can be infringed without triggering
an indigent person’s right to appointed counsel.”5
In In re B.B., the great-grandparents petitioned the juvenile court
for emergency custody of minor children, B.B. and D.B., and

* Associate Member, 2014-2015 University of Cincinnati Law Review. I would like to thank
Professor Michael Solimine for his help in selecting this topic, pointing me in the right direction as I
tackled my first law review submission, and assisting me on some tricky citations. I also would like to
thank my friend and mentor, Judge Sheila Calloway, Davidson County Juvenile Court, Nashville,
Tennessee, for her continued encouragement and support and for modeling what it means to serve
children and families. I also owe a special thank you to Supreme Court of Ohio Justice Sharon Kennedy
for consulting with me during my first draft and for reminding me to “always check the pocket parts.”
And finally, to my mom, I continue to admire your selflessness and grit. Thank you for making me the
advocate I am today.
1. In re Keylor, No. 04 MO 02, 2005 WL 775890, at *15 (Ohio 7th Dist. Ct. App. March 30,
2005) (DeGenaro, J., dissenting).
2. See, e.g., Ohio Const. Art. IV § 2(B)(2)(e); Ohio Sup. Ct. Prac. R. 5.02(A)(3); Ohio Sup. Ct.
Prac. R. 7.01(B)(1)(d)(iii).
3. In re B.B., 11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014).
4. Id. (O’Donnell and Kennedy, J.J., dissenting) (O’Neill, J., dissenting with opinion).
5. Id. (O’Neill, J., dissenting). During my November 1, 2014 telephone conversation with
Justice Sharon Kennedy, Justice Kennedy stated that she would have heard the issues raised in In re
B.B., because she believed them to be a matter of interest to Ohioans pursuant to Ohio Const. Art. IV
§ 2(B)(2)(e). Telephone Interview with Hon. Sharon Kennedy, Justice, Supreme Court of Ohio (Nov. 1,
2014).
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requested that the court terminate visitation between the children and
their parents.6 In their complaints, the great-grandparents alleged
that “the parents had sexually abused the children, had abandoned
them, were unable to provide care and support for them, and were
unfit parents.”7
Under current Ohio statutory construction and juvenile rules of
court,8 the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas determined that
neither the parents in In re B.B.—nor their minor children—were
entitled to appointed counsel.9 Because the children were not wards
of the state,10 the court found that the “civil matters” exception
specified in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 applied.11 The
juvenile court magistrate awarded the great-grandparents legal
custody of both children, and the common pleas court judge adopted
the magistrate’s recommendation.12 Notably, the great-grandparents
were represented by their own private counsel throughout the custody
proceedings.13
On appeal, the parents argued that the right to court appointed
counsel should extend to indigent parties in private action custody
cases.14 While both the United States Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court of Ohio have held that there is no absolute right to
court appointed counsel in civil matters,15 both courts recently have
6. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *2 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014), rev. denied,
11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014).
7. In re B.B., 11 N.E.3d. at 286.
8. See, specifically, the qualifying language of both OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352—“If, as
an indigent person, a party is unable to employ counsel, the party is entitled to have counsel . . . except
in civil matters in which the juvenile court is exercising jurisdiction pursuant to division (A)(2) . . . .”—
and Ohio R. Juv. P. 4—“This rule shall not be construed to provide for a right to appointed counsel in
cases in which that right is not otherwise provided for by constitution or statute.” (West 2014).
9. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *4.
10. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.23(A)(2) (concerning jurisdiction of the juvenile court “to
determine the custody of any child not a ward of another court of this state”) (West 2014).
11. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *6-7; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (West 2014)
(“If, as an indigent person, a party is unable to employ counsel, the party is entitled to have counsel
provided for the person pursuant to Chapter 120. of the Revised Code except in civil matters in which
the juvenile court is exercising jurisdiction pursuant to division (A)(2) . . . of section 2151.23 of the
Revised Code.”) (emphasis added).
12. In re B.B., 11 N.E.3d. at 286.
13. Appellant’s Mem. Supp. Jurisdiction, at 2, In re B.B., 11 N.E.3d 286 (Mar. 27, 2014),
available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/pdf_viewer/pdf_viewer.aspx?pdf=743397.pdf
14. See, in particular, Appellants’ first Proposition of Law. Id. at 4–5, 6.
15. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 33 (1981)
(recognizing that while “wise public policy [] may require that higher standards be adopted than those
minimally tolerable under the Constitution,” under the circumstances, the trial court was not required to
appoint counsel for appellant in termination of parental rights case); State ex rel. Asberry v. Payne, 693
N.E.2d 796 (Ohio 1998), superseded by 2005 amendment to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (noting
that there is no requirement under the federal Constitution that all indigent parties in a juvenile
proceeding be provided appointed counsel).
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examined that right through a fundamental fairness lens.16 Although
not child custody cases, these more recent decisions should provide
prospective guidance for Ohio courts concerning the appointment of
counsel to indigent parties.
This Comment examines whether Ohio courts should extend the
right to appointed counsel to indigent parents in civil custody suits.
Part II outlines how the United States and Ohio Supreme Courts have
viewed the question of appointment of counsel to indigent parties in
other civil matters. Tracing legislative history, Part II also reveals
that in Ohio, an indigent parent’s statutory right to appointed counsel
was removed to reduce county and state budgets. Part III argues that,
despite the textual differences between legal custody and permanent
custody, the impact realized by indigent parents in civil custody cases
is akin to permanent removal—irrespective of the statutory label—
and runs afoul of due process and fundamental fairness. Finally, Part
IV concludes that a categorical elimination of an indigent party’s
right to appointed counsel in so-called private action custody cases
impedes meaningful access to the courts for indigent parents and
their children. Ohio statutory law should not be read as a complete
bar to appointed counsel for indigent parents in civil actions.
II. BACKGROUND

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”17 Article I, Section 16 of the
Ohio Constitution parallels the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
protections.18 Both the United States and Ohio Supreme Courts have
recognized a parent’s “basic civil right” to raise his or her children.19
Since parents have constitutional custodial rights, any action by the

16. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507 (2011); Liming v. Damos, 979 N.E.2d 297 (Ohio
2012).
17. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. In re B.C., 21 N.E.3d 308, 312 (Ohio 2014).
19. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (finding that the parent-child
relationship “undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection.”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (supporting that a parent’s interest in the
care, custody, and management of his or her child is “fundamental,” and “does not evaporate simply
because [the parents] have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child . . . .”);
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (concluding “it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”); In re Perales, 369 N.E.2d 1047, 1051–52
(Ohio 1977) (describing a parent’s right to the custody of his or her child as “paramount.”); In re
Murray, 556 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (Ohio 1990) (recognizing that the right to raise a child is an “essential”
and “basic civil right.”) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
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state that affects this parental right, such as granting custody of a
child to a non-parent, must be conducted pursuant to procedures that
are fundamentally fair.20
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court held in Lassiter v. Dept.
of Social Services of Durham Cty., N.C.21 that the Constitution does
not require courts to appoint counsel for indigent parents in all
termination of parental rights proceedings.22 According to the
Lassiter majority, there is a presumption of a right to court appointed
counsel only where loss of one’s physical liberty is at stake. 23 Yet,
under Lassiter, even when confinement is a possibility in a civil case,
a court must balance the strength of the litigant’s interest, the risk of
error, and the state’s interest to determine whether the court should
appoint counsel.24 Applying these balancing factors, the Lassiter
Court recognized that “the State shares with the parent an interest in a
correct decision, [and] has a relatively weak pecuniary interest” in
avoiding the expense of court appointed counsel.25 However, as
reasoned by the majority, the failure to appoint counsel does not
presumptively deny a parent of constitutional rights where the
presence of counsel could not have made a determinative
difference.26
Twenty years after Lassiter, the United States Supreme Court held
in Turner v. Rogers that the State is not automatically required “to
provide counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent
noncustodial parent who is subject to a child support order, even if
that individual faces incarceration.”27 The Court further found that a
State meets due process requirements when it provides “alternative
procedural safeguards.”28 The Turner Court, however, ultimately
determined that the defendant “received neither counsel nor the
benefit of alternative procedures.”29 The defendant’s incarceration
thus violated due process.

20. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982); In re Adoption of Mays, 507 N.E.2d 453,
456 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
21. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
22. Id. at 31.
23. Id. at 26–27.
24. Id. at 27 (referencing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
25. Id. at 19, 31 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 33.
27. 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2510, 2520 (2011).
28. Id. at 2520 (finding that due process “does not require the provision of counsel where the
opposing parent or other custodian . . . is not represented by counsel and the State provides alternative
procedural safeguards . . . .”).
29. Id. (listing alternate procedures as “adequate notice of the importance of ability to pay, fair
opportunity to present, and to dispute, relevant information, and court findings.”)
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A. Modifications to Ohio’s Juvenile Law

The Supreme Court of Ohio last interpreted the bounds of the
appointment of counsel in civil custody suits in 1998 when it decided
State ex rel. Asberry v. Payne.30 In Asberry, the court held that the
plain language of Ohio’s “right to counsel” statute31 provided that
“indigent children, parents, custodians, or other persons in loco
parentis were entitled to appointed counsel in all juvenile
proceedings.”32 The court determined that a grandmother, who had
cared for and supported her grandchild for several years,33 satisfied
the definition of in loco parentis34 and thus qualified for court
appointed counsel as a party to the proceeding.35 Despite a previous
amendment to the juvenile rules of procedure concerning assistance
of counsel,36 the court clarified that the grandmother’s right to
appointed counsel clearly emanated from statute, and, under the
circumstances, Ohio statutory law required that counsel be
appointed.37
The right to counsel statute,38 however, was amended in 2005
specifically to “remove[] an indigent person’s right to appointed
counsel in certain civil proceedings in juvenile court.” 39 Now, when
30. 693 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio 1998), superseded by 2005 amendment to OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.352. See H.R. 66, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) discussed infra, at notes 42, 44,
and accompanying text.
31. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352.
32. Asberry, 693 N.E.2d. at 798 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 795.
34. Id. at 798 n.2 (stating that “[a] person in loco parentis assumes the same duties as a guardian
or custodian, although not through a legal proceeding.”); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)
(defining in loco parentis as “in the place of a parent . . . [o]f, relating to, or acting as a temporary
guardian or caretaker of a child, taking on all or some of the responsibilities of a parent.”).
35. Id. at 798.
36. Id. See also qualifying sentence added to Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A) in 1994 (“This rule shall not
be construed to provide a right to appointed counsel in cases in which that right is not otherwise
provided for by constitution or statute.”).
37. Asberry, 693 N.E.2d. at 798, 799.
38. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352.
39. See In re M.E.H., No. 08CA4, 2008 WL 2766107, at *3 n.1 (Ohio 4th Dist. Ct. App. July 10,
2008) (“We acknowledge that State ex rel. Asberry v. Payne . . . required a trial court to appoint counsel
in a similar situation. However, after Payne, the legislature amended R.C. 2151.352, which now limits
the right to counsel at government expense. See House Bill. 66.”) House Bill 66 modified an indigent
party’s right to appointed counsel in 2005. In In re B.B., however, the Third District string cites to a
case, In re D.J.M., which incorrectly references January 1, 2002 as the date the statute changed. In re
B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at 7 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014), review denied, 11 N.E.3d 286
(Ohio 2014); see also In re D.J.M., 2011-L-022, 2011 WL 6938427, at *6 (Ohio 11th Dist. Ct. App.
Dec. 30, 2011) (finding that "[t]he statute has since been amended, effective January 1, 2002, [sic] to
specify that the right to appointed counsel for indigent parties at government expense does not apply to
civil custody matters filed under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2)”). A close look at legislative history reveals that a
Senate Bill enacted in 2002—S. 179, 123rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2002), available at
http://archives.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText123/123_SB_179_ENR.pdf—simply
modified
the
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a proceeding is initiated for legal custody of a child who is not a ward
of the state,40 it is treated as a “civil matter,” 41 excepted from any
entitlement to appointed counsel.
B. Counting the Costs: Why Limit Indigent Ohioans’ Right to
Appointed Counsel in Civil Matters?
Ohio’s Amended Substitute House Bill 66 (H.B. 66),42 labeled a
“Budget Bill,”43 specifically removed, “[f]or certain civil matters
only, . . . an indigent person’s [statutory] right to appointed counsel
when the person is a party to a proceeding in juvenile court.” 44 H.B. 66
adjusted Ohio’s main operating budget and implemented certain budget
cuts for the fiscal year 2006 to 2007.45 Interestingly, the bill, as
introduced, did not contemplate eliminating an indigent party’s right to
appointed counsel.46 Nonetheless, after the Ohio General Assembly
enacted H.B. 66, the lens for approving counsel for indigent parties in
civil custody suits shifted from fundamental fairness to fiscal
language of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 to make the statute gender neutral. See S. 179, 123rd
Gen. Assemb., at 78. Thus, despite the court’s assertions in In re D.J.M., an indigent party’s right to
court appointed counsel in juvenile court proceedings remained intact until 2005. The source of the
court’s error may be linked to a curious reference found in a 2002 Sixth District appellate court opinion
concerning visitation. See In re Bobbi Jo S. v. Jeff W.C., No. L–01–1252, 2002 WL 360675 (Ohio 6th
Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2002) (finding that although the right to court appointed counsel for indigent
parties in juvenile court cases was recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court in Asberry, the controlling
“statute has since been amended, effective January 1, 2002, to specify that the right to appointed counsel
. . . is now limited . . . .”). The court in In re D.J.M. pin cites to the Bobbi Jo opinion to bolster its
stance that the “appellant was therefore not entitled to appointed counsel.” In re D.J.M., 2011 WL
6938427, at *6. Importantly, the court in In re D.J.M. mischaracterizes the holding of In re Bobbi Jo.
Despite the misinterpretation found in In re Bobbi Jo concerning the amendment to Ohioans’ statutory
right to counsel, the Bobbi Jo court actually held that “the child was clearly entitled to an appointed
attorney under the law then in effect.” In re Bobbi Jo, 2002 WL 360675, at *2 (emphasis added). Thus,
the Third District court’s string cite list of authorities, In re B.B., Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. at *7, contains
procedural and factual errors.
40. Pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.23(A)(2) (West 2014).
41. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352, which governs the right to counsel in juvenile
proceedings, now provides:
A child, the child’s parents or custodian, or any other person in loco parentis of the child is
entitled to representation by legal counsel at all stages of the proceedings under this chapter or
Chapter 2152. of the Revised Code. If, as an indigent person, a party is unable to employ
counsel, the party is entitled to have counsel provided for the person pursuant to Chapter 120. of
the Revised Code except in civil matters in which the juvenile court is exercising jurisdiction
pursuant to division (A)(2) . . . of section 2151.23 of the Revised Code. (emphasis added).
42. H.R. 66, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).
43. OHIO
126TH
GEN.
ASSEMB.,
JOURNAL
2
(2005-2006),
available
at
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/records/journal/acts_126.pdf.
44. OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, FINAL ANALYSIS 415 (2005), available at
http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/analyses126/05-hb66-126.pdf.
45. See OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, FINAL STATUS REP. OF LEGIS. 2 (May 4, 2007).
46. To track the changes from when the bill was introduced, passed, and enacted, see OHIO
LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, FINAL COMPARISON DOC. 746 (Sep. 27, 2005).
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constraint.47
The projected fiscal effect of H.B. 66 reads as follows:
Fiscal effect: As a result of the provision’s restriction on the use of
appointed counsel in certain juvenile court matters, theoretically at
least, (1) counties may realize a decrease in the amount of money
spent annually on legal assistance, and (2) the state may realize a
decrease in the amount of money that it reimburses counties
annually for the provision of indigent defense legal services.48
This fiscal analysis is puzzling in light of a contemporaneous task
force appointed by former Supreme Court of Ohio Chief Justice,
Thomas J. Moyer, “to examine indigent and pro se legal
representation . . . [and] ensure that Ohio citizens who cannot afford
to . . . hire an attorney have the same fair and equal access to the court
system as those with representation.”49
Curiously, in April 2006—a year after H.B. 66 took effect—the task
force released its report and recommended that funding be increased for
civil legal representation, not stymied.50 The report pointed out that
“civil indigent representation in Ohio is seriously under-funded” and
acknowledged that “adequate representation of indigent persons in civil
proceedings, although not constitutionally mandated, is a matter of
substantial interest to the people of Ohio.51 Importantly, the task force
further found representation “of indigent Ohioans in civil
disputes . . . critical to the fair administration of justice [in assuring] that
indigent persons have meaningful access to the courts . . . .”52 The task
force concluded that substantial additional funding was needed “to
provide legal assistance to all indigent Ohioans involved in civil legal
matters.”53
Four months later, an American Bar Association (ABA) task force
also recommended that indigent litigants be appointed counsel in civil

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Office of Pub. Info., Moyer Appoints Task Force to Examine Indigent and Pro Se Legal
Representation, SUP. CT. & JUD. SYS. NEWS, May 13, 2004, available at
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/PIO/news/2004/indigent_051304.asp.
50. HON. JOHN ADKINS, CHAIR, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT TASK
FORCE ON PRO SE & INDIGENT LITIGANTS 36 (Apr. 2006), available at
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/prose/report_april06.pdf.
51. Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added); see also Ohio Const. Art. IV § 2(B)(2)(e); Ohio Sup. Ct. Prac.
R. 5.02(A)(3); Ohio Sup. Ct. Prac. R. 7.01(B)(1)(d)(iii).
52. ADKINS, supra note 50, at 37.
53. Id. (emphasis added). The report did not address the 126th General Assembly’s recent
legislation excluding certain Ohioans from court appointed legal assistance.
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matters.54 The ABA “urge[d] federal, state, and territorial governments
to provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low
income persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where
basic human needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter,
sustenance, safety, health or child custody.”55
More recently, Supreme Court of Ohio Chief Justice, Maureen
O’Connor, has stated that “[a]ccess to justice should be an essential part
of any state’s legal system and the need to meet that goal has only
increased in [] times of economic stress.”56 Yet, despite documented
national and local concern, Ohio eliminated the right to appointed
counsel for indigent persons in certain child custody cases and never
reinstituted it.
C. The Genesis of Ohio’s Restricted Right to Appointed Counsel

Prior to Ohio’s statutory elimination of an indigent party’s right to
appointed counsel in certain juvenile court proceedings, the Supreme
Court of Ohio proposed a controversial amendment to the juvenile
rule concerning assistance of counsel.57 The existing rule provided,
in relevant part, that “[e]very party shall have the right to be
represented by counsel and every child, parent, custodian, or other
person in loco parentis the right to appointed counsel if indigent.”58
The Supreme Court, however, sought to abrogate an indigent party’s
right to court appointed counsel in cases concerning “custody,
visitation, and modification of child support” and in “so-called
‘private’ child abuse, neglect or dependency actions.”59 In response,
Representative David Hartley initiated House Concurrent Resolution
38 to “disapprove the proposed amendments to the Ohio Rules of
Juvenile Procedure.”60
During committee meetings, members of the Ohio State Legal
Services Association and Ohio Public Defenders Commission
54. HON. HOWARD H. DANA, JR., CHAIR, AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL
JUSTICE, 112A REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1, 17 (Aug. 2006), available at
http://www.legalaidnc.org/Public/Participate/community/ABA_Resolution_onehundredtwelvea[1].pdf.
55. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
56. Barbara Peck, Access Crisis: Ohio and Other States Struggle to Provide Liberty and Justice
for All, ALL RISE, OHIO ST. UNIV. MORITZ COLLEGE OF LAW MAGAZINE 46, 47 (Summer 2013),
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/news/allrise/2013/07/access-crisis-ohio-and-other-states-struggleto-provide-liberty-and-justice-for-all/.
57. See generally PAUL C. GIANNELLI & PATRICIA YEOMANS SALVADOR, OHIO JUV. L. § 40:3
(West 2014) (outlining the genesis of the 1994 amendment to Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A)); see also HOUSE
CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW COMM., H.R. CON. R. 38 COMM. REP. (Mar. 22, 1994), available at
http://www.rotundacollection.com/Hannah/Report_CommitteeReport.aspx?id=108&ps=true&HL=True.
58. Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A).
59. GIANNELLI & YEOMANS, supra note 57.
60. H.R. Con. Res. 38, 120th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 1994).
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strongly opposed the proposed rule amendment.61 Attorney Michael
Smalz, for example, challenged the new rule as “giv[ing] the court
too much authority to deny a clear right to counsel.”62 He further
challenged the rule as a “major step backwards” from Ohio’s “effort
to provide legal services to the poor.”63 Other commenters also
vigorously attacked the proposed amendment during the rule change
public comment period as limiting the right to appointed counsel for
indigent persons.64 The court, in response, withdrew its proposal and
substituted it with an amendment, subsequently accepted by the Ohio
House of Representatives Civil & Commercial Law committee.65
The substituted language of the juvenile rule retained the rule’s
previous language concerning court appointed counsel, but added a
qualifying sentence, which—as enacted—reads: “This rule shall not
be construed to provide a right to appointed counsel in cases in which
that right is not otherwise provided for by constitution or statute.”66
The accompanying Staff Note indicates that this sentence was added
“to clarify that Juv. R. 4 does not create a right to court-appointed
counsel, and that the right to appointed counsel arises from other
sources of law.”67 Ohio courts, therefore, are left to decide whether
and what “other sources of law extend the right to appointed counsel
in [] juvenile court proceedings.”68
D. Applying “Other Sources of Law”: Are Any Doors Open?

In Liming v. Damos,69 the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the due
process clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions did not
mandate appointment of counsel for an indigent parent at a purge
61. See HOUSE CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW COMM., H.R. CON. R. 38 COMM. REPS.
(Mar.
15,
1994,
Mar.
22,
1994,
&
May
17,
1994),
available
at
http://www.rotundacollection.com/Hannah/Report_CommitteeReport.aspx?id=107&ps=true&HL=True;
http://www.rotundacollection.com/Hannah/Report_CommitteeReport.aspx?id=108&ps=true&HL=True;
and http://www.rotundacollection.com/Hannah/Report_CommitteeReport.aspx?id=110&ps=true&HL=
True. In contrast to the fiscal constraint proposed in the 2005 budget bill limiting a right to court
appointed counsel in certain juvenile court matters, see text accompanying notes 47 and 48, supra, the
Ohio Public Defenders Office—opposing Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A)’s proposed amendment—presented
testimony that private custody actions “are a small part of the caseload and wouldn’t be a financial
burden.” HOUSE CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW COMM. at Mar. 22, 1994 report.
62. HOUSE CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW COMM., at March 15, 1994 report.
63. Id.
64. Id. See also GIANNELLI & YEOMANS, supra note 57.
65. See GIANNELLI & YEOMANS, supra note 57; HOUSE CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW COMM.,
supra note 61, at May 24, 1994 report.
66. Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A) (emphasis added). See also GIANNELLI & YEOMANS, supra note 57.
67. See Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A); GIANNELLI & YEOMANS, supra note 57.
68. GIANNELLI & YEOMANS, supra note 57 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. 979 N.E.2d 297 (Ohio 2012).
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hearing70 for failure to pay child support, “when that parent was
previously represented by counsel at the originating civil-contempt
proceeding.”71 Although appellant faced possible incarceration, the
court nevertheless determined that the matter stemmed from the
original civil contempt proceeding, and, therefore, due process did
not require that the court provide counsel in civil matters.72
Conversely, in 2013, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided State ex
rel. McQueen v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate
Division and found that the right to appointed counsel extended to
indigent parties in guardianship review hearings.73 The court
acknowledged that, while no absolute right to counsel exists in civil
litigation, the Ohio legislature may provide an indigent party with
such right.74 Based on the plain language of the statutes governing
guardianship proceedings, the court found that the hearing
requirements concerning guardianship appointments extended to and
provided for appointment of counsel at review hearings.75
On October 16, 2014, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided another
matter concerning an indigent party’s rights—this time in the context
of custody proceedings.76 In In re B.C., the court ruled that a parent
is not entitled to file a delayed appeal contesting termination of his or
her parental rights.77
The Court acknowledged that “[t]he
fundamental requisites of due process of law in any proceeding are
notice and the opportunity to be heard.”78 However, because
appellant had voluntarily appeared before the court, surrendered her
parental rights, and, moreover, was represented by counsel during the
termination proceedings, the court found that sufficient procedural
safeguards existed and ensured that the appellant’s termination
hearing was “fundamentally fair.”79

70. Id. at 299, 306 (defining a purge hearing as “a hearing to determine whether a contemnor has
purged himself of [his previous] civil contempt” by complying with the court’s conditions). See also
Black’s Law Dictionary (WestlawNext 2014) (defining “purge” as “[t]o exonerate (oneself or another)
of guilt <the judge purged the defendant of contempt>.”).
71. Liming, 979 N.E.2d at 306.
72. Id. at 299.
73. 986 N.E.2d 925, 931 (Ohio 2013).
74. Id. at 928 (citing State ex rel. Asberry v. Payne, 693 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio 1998) to illustrate that
the right to court appointed counsel in juvenile court custody cases existed pursuant to Ohio Revised
Code prior to its amendment).
75. Id. at 929-30.
76. In re B.C., 21 N.E.3d 308 (Ohio 2014).
77. Id. at 309, 315.
78. Id. at 312.
79. Id. at 312, 315.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol83/iss4/9

10

Brunett: When Loss of Legal Custody Is Like an Indeterminate Prison Senten

2015]

INDIGENT PARENTS’ RIGHT TO COUNSEL

1433

III. DISCUSSION

Because complete termination of a parent’s rights over the custody
and care of his or her child “has been described as the family law
equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case,”80 parents,
therefore, “must be afforded every procedural and substantive
protection [that] the law allows.”81 Although In re B.B. involves
something less than the permanent termination of parental rights,
both parents were indigent parties to the custody removal hearing,
and their fundamental right to the care and custody of their children
was impacted by the magistrate’s refusal to appoint them counsel.
A. Right to Counsel, but No Right to Appointed Counsel

Ohio statutory law82 provides that an indigent party is entitled to
counsel, but also qualifies that entitlement with enumerated
exceptions to restrict the right to appointed counsel when a juvenile
court exercises its jurisdiction in civil matters.83 As applied to In re
B.B., the great-grandparents petitioned the court for emergency
custody of B.B. and D.B.84 The court informed the parents of their
right to representation,85 however denied the parents a right to an
appointed attorney.86 The court explained that Ohio statutory law
limits an indigent party’s entitlement to appointed counsel in certain
civil matters before the juvenile court.87 After the parents failed to
retain a lawyer, the court cautioned that they would be proceeding
pro se.88
The great-grandparents, through hired counsel, filed sworn
statements that both parents had abandoned the kids, “were unable to
provide [for their] care and support, and were unfit parents.”89 The
great-grandparents subsequently filed amended complaints alleging
80. Id. at 313 (citing In re Smith, 601 N.E.2d 45, 55 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
81. Id.
82. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352.
83. See OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, FINAL ANALYSIS, supra note 44, at 415 (“[I]f the party is
indigent, the party is not entitled to appointed counsel in a civil matter if the court is exercising
jurisdiction pursuant to one of the following bases listed in R.C. 2151.23(A)(2), (3), (9), (10), (11), (12),
or (13); (B)(2) through (6); (C); (D); or (F)(1) or (2) . . . To determine the custody of any child not a
ward of another Ohio court . . . .”).
84. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *2 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014), rev. denied,
11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014).
85. Id.; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 and Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A).
86. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *2.
87. Id.; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352.
88. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *3.
89. Id. at *2.
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sexual abuse and failure to protect.90 The Third District strictly
construed the limiting language of Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A)’s assistance
of counsel91 in conjunction with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352’s
right to counsel92 when denying B.B.’s and D.B.’s parents court
appointed representation. However, in light of the statutory
definitions of dependency, abuse, and neglect,93 coupled with the
allegations of abuse, sexual abuse, and abandonment embedded in
the great-grandparents’ complaints,94 the juvenile court could have—
and, arguably, should have—appointed counsel for the parents, as
well as a guardian ad litem to represent the best interests of the
children.95 Indeed, Chapter 2151 of the Ohio Revised Code outlines
procedures for cases involving juveniles, including custody hearings,
and directs courts to interpret the chapter’s provisions liberally.96
The statute further mandates that judicial procedures must ensure that
the parties receive a fair hearing, in which “constitutional and other
legal rights are recognized and enforced.”97 Justice O’Donnell’s
dissent in Liming captures the same sentiment:
“Assuming
indigency . . . the court violated Liming’s right to procedural due
process when it denied his request for appointed counsel.”98
Although the Ohio General Assembly expressly “limit[ed] the
right to counsel at government expense,”99 this limitation should not
foreclose the possibility that fundamental fairness—“the touchstone
of due process”—might require the appointment of counsel under
certain circumstances.100 Notably, the Liming majority recognized
90. Id.
91. Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A) (qualifying that “[t]his rule shall not be construed to provide for a right
to appointed counsel in cases in which that right is not otherwise provided for by constitution or
statute.”).
92. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (recognizing a right to court appointed counsel “except in
civil matters in which the juvenile court is exercising jurisdiction pursuant to division (A)(2) . . . .”).
93. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.04 (West 2014) (defining “dependent child”); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.03 (West 2014) (defining “neglected child”); and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.031
(West 2014) (defining “abused child”).
94. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *2.
95. See State ex rel. McQueen v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate Div., 986
N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ohio 2013) (comparing the plain language of the statutes to determine counsel should
be provided).
96. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01 (West 2014).
97. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01(B).
98. Liming v. Damos, 979 N.E.2d 297, 309 (Ohio 2012) (O’Donnell, J., dissenting). See also
Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 59 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“Meeting the Court on its own terms, Justice Blackmun demonstrates that the Mathews v. Eldridge
analysis requires the appointment of counsel in this type of case.”).
99. In re M.E.H., No. 08CA4, 2008 WL 2766107, at *3 n.1 (Ohio 4th Dist. Ct. App. July 10,
2008).
100. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (“We thus find no justification for a new
inflexible constitutional rule with respect to the requirement of counsel. We think, rather, that the
decision as to the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis . . . .”).
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that an attorney represented Liming at the original hearing, and
neither Liming nor his counsel objected to the magistrate’s decision
or otherwise appealed the contempt order.101 According to the
majority, Liming enjoyed the procedural safeguards akin to those
outlined in Turner.102 The court further determined that the risk that
the judicial procedure would lead to an erroneous decision was
low.103
In contrast, the parents in In re B.B. were forced to defend
themselves during the custody hearing.104 They timely filed
objections to the juvenile court judgment. 105 Because “[b]oth parents
and children have interests to protect when threatened with Courtordered separation,”106 it is fundamentally unfair to require indigent
parents to face a represented opponent in court when their parentchild relationship is at stake. Indeed, the ABA task force warned of
“the impossibility of delivering justice rather than injustice in many
cases unless both sides, not just those who can afford it, are
represented by lawyers.”107 Moreover, “our adversary system of
justice assumes that both sides are capable of participating.”108
As noted by Ohio Supreme Court Chief Justice Maureen
O’Connor, although the court “has been active in supporting litigants
that are self-representing, . . . [t]his has an upside and a
downside . . . . Sometimes [pro se litigants] do themselves more harm
than good when they represent themselves, but they do not have
access to representation or do not qualify for aid.”109
While Ohio has rejected a categorical rule requiring the
appointment of counsel for indigent parents in all custody

101. Liming, 979 N.E.2d at 306.
102. Id. See also discussion of Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011), supra notes 28
and 29 and accompanying text.
103. Liming, 979 N.E.2d at 306.
104. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *3 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014), rev. denied,
11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014).
105. Id. at 4.
106. In re A.G. B., 878 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2007).
107. AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE, supra note 54, at 16. Notably, the ABA filed an amicus brief
in Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) advocating that “in order to
minimize [the risk of error] and ensure a fair hearing, procedural due process demands that counsel be
made available to parents, and that if the parents are indigent, it be at public expense.” Id. at 2, 3. See
ABA Brief as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty.,
N.C., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (No. 79-6423), 1980 WL 340036, at *3–*4.
108. HOUSE CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW COMM., supra note 57, at Mar. 22, 1994 report.
109. Peck, supra note 56, at 47; see also Appellate Br., In re Marriage of King v. King, 174 P.3d
659 (Wash. 2007) (No. 79978-4), 2006 WL 5109904, at *1 (highlighting statement made by indigent
mother during custody removal proceeding: “I'm a good mother; I'm a lousy lawyer.”); Powell v. Ala.,
287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (“The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2015

13

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 9

1436

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 83

proceedings,110 it at one time recognized this right.111 Although the
right to counsel statute now reads that no entitlement to appointed
counsel exists,112 court appointed representation arguably still
remains available at a judge’s discretion.113
B. Limited Jurisdiction: Interpretations and Misinterpretations by
Ohio Courts

While some interpretations of Ohio statutory law may exclude the
appointment of counsel in cases where a child is not ward of the
state,114 the Ohio Fourth District Court of Appeals’ holdings in In re
T.C.K.115 and In re A.G.B.116 highlight the unsettled nature of Ohio
juvenile courts’ appointments of counsel to indigent parties in socalled private action custody cases.
In In re T.C.K., the Fourth District found that “[n]either appellant
nor the child ha[d] a right to appointed counsel in a private custody
matter between a parent and a non-parent and in which the state [did]
not seek a termination of parental rights.”117 The court documented
that the county children services agency previously had placed
T.C.K. in the paternal aunt’s legal custody,118 but that this case arose
from the aunt’s custody petition.119 Nonetheless, the trial court
appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the child’s best interests in
response to the aunt’s private-party petition for legal custody.120
In In re A.G.B., the father, as a private party actor, filed an
emergency custody complaint against the child’s mother alleging that
A.G.B. was an abused, neglected, and dependent child.121 Even
110. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352, as amended.
111. See discussion of Asberry v. Payne, 693 N.E.2d 794, 798-99 (Ohio 1998), supra text
accompanying notes 32 and 37.
112. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352.
113. See HOUSE CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW COMM., H.R. CON. R. 38 COMM. REP. (Mar. 29,
1994),
available
at
http://www.rotundacollection.com/Hannah/Report_CommitteeReport.aspx?id=109&ps=true&HL=True
(arguing that while there is no right to court appointed counsel in private cases . . . “the [proposed] rule
does not preclude counsel, but gives judges discretion.”); see also State ex rel. McQueen v. Cuyahoga
Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate Div., 986 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ohio 2013) (finding the issue
“susceptible of different interpretations.”).
114. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.23(A)(2).
115. No. 13CA3, 2013 WL 4477400 (Ohio 4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2013).
116. 878 N.E.2d 49 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2007).
117. No. 13CA3, 2013 WL 4477400, at *6.
118. Id. at *1, *2 (presumably pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(A)(3) as outlined in
S. 238, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2006); see discussion infra, at notes 154 and 155).
119. In re T.C.K., No. 13CA3, 2013 WL 4477400, at *8.
120. Id. at *1, *6.
121. 878 N.E.2d 49, 51, 54 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2007) (noting that the father’s complaint was
filed pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.23(A)(1), the subsection purportedly reserved for filings
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though the county children services agency did not initiate the
proceedings, the magistrate appointed counsel to represent the
mother,122 and, on remand, was required to appoint a guardian ad
litem for the child.123 The mother’s failure to request appointment of
a guardian ad litem did not waive the juvenile court’s mandatory duty
to appoint one under statute.124 Judge Harsha “regretfully” concurred
in the judgment, yet nonetheless agreed that the child was entitled to
the services of guardian ad litem despite the mother’s belated
request.125 According to Judge Harsha, “[w]ere we to decide that the
mother couldn’t raise the child’s right, by whom and how would that
interest gain protection?”126 Judge Abele dissented, noting that the
“filing and presentation of the case did not involve the local public
children services agency.”127 In his opinion, the statute should “not
apply to ‘private’ custody disputes.”128
Similar to the father in In re A.G.B., the great-grandparents in In re
B.B. alleged neglect, abuse, and sexual abuse in their emergency
petition and amended petition for custody.129 Pursuant to the Ohio
statute concerning the appointment of guardians ad litem,130 a
guardian shall be appointed to protect the interests of an “alleged
abused or neglected child.”131 Yet the Third District reasoned that
because the “case was not filed as a dependency, abuse, or neglect
proceeding,”132 and because the trial court never adjudicated the
children as abused, neglected, or dependent, this somehow precluded
the court from appointing counsel.133 The juvenile court and Third
District thus erred in myopically severing the method of filing from
the statute governing appointment of guardians ad litem.134
by children services agencies).
122. Id. at 51, 54.
123. Id. at 54.
124. Id. at 53.
125. Id. at 54 (Harsha, J., concurring).
126. Id. But see In re T.C.K., No. 13CA3, 2013-WL-4477400, at *5 (Ohio 4th Dist Ct. App. Aug.
12, 2013) (finding that mother “lacks standing to raise an error relating to the child’s wavier of
counsel.”); In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at 8 n.3 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014), rev.
denied, 11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014) (questioning the parents’ standing to argue against the trial court’s
failure to appoint a guardian ad litem).
127. In re A.G.B., 878 N.E.2d at 54 (Abele, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 55.
129. In re B.B., Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. at 2.
130. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.281(B)(1) (West 2014).
131. Id. (emphasis added); see also the third sentence of Ohio R. Juv. P. 4(A) (“When the
complaint alleges that a child is an abused child, the court must appoint an attorney to represent the
interests of the child.”) (emphasis added).
132. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *4 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at *8.
134. According to the simplified logic of the Third District, “In In re A.G.B., the father filed a
complaint pursuant to R.C. 2151.27(A)(1) alleging that A.G.B. was an abused, neglected, and dependent
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As reasoned by the Third District in In re B.B., “the trial court
never invoked its jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 2151.23(A)(1) to
adjudicate B.B. and D.B. abused, neglected, or dependent children.
Thus, the grant of custody to [the great-grandparents] was not based
on a finding of abuse, neglect or dependency,”135 nor were the
children wards of the state.136 Because the great-grandparents filed
the complaint for legal custody alleging that the children’s parents
were unfit parents, under the court’s strict interpretation of Ohio
statutory law, this fell within an exception to the rule entitling
indigent parties to appointed counsel.137
Although the county children services agency did not initiate the
custody action,138 this case, similar to In re A.G.B. and In re T.C.K.,
nonetheless concerned allegations of abuse and neglect.139 Because a
parent has a “fundamental liberty interest . . . in the care, custody,
and management of [his or her] child,”140 the ramifications of loss of
custody apply “equally in the context of an abuse or neglect
proceeding in which a parent may potentially lose custody of his or
her child to a children services agency or to an individual.”141 An
indigent parent’s fundamental right to appointed counsel should not
hinge on distinguishing custody actions brought by private parties
from those brought by children services agencies.
Notably, the Ohio statute governing the filing of juvenile court
complaints142 states that complaints may be brought by “any person
having knowledge of a child who appears . . . to be [] unruly, abused,
neglected, or dependent . . . .”143 It appears that the Third District
conflated the statutory jurisdiction of the juvenile court144 with the
statutory guidelines for filing a complaint.145 As a result, the Third
District erroneously distinguished the facts and circumstances of In
child. Here, the [great-grandparents] filed a complaint for legal custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.27(A)(2)
alleging that [the children’s parents] were unfit parents.” In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *8, *9
(emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, the court refused to appoint counsel for
the parents or a guardian ad litem for the children.
135. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *6 (emphasis added).
136. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.23(A)(2).
137. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *7.
138. Id. at *2. Frankly, this writer is surprised the State was not involved due to the nature of the
allegations.
139. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *2. See also In re A.G.B., 878 N.E.2d 49, 54 (Ohio
Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2007).
140. In re A.G.B., 878 N.E.2d at 53 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.27 (West 2014).
143. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.27(A)(1) (emphasis added). Moreover, the language of
(A)(2) addresses habitual truancy, which is inapplicable here.
144. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.23(A)(1)–(2).
145. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.27(A)(1)–(2).
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re A.G.B. and the principles of its holding from In re B.B.,146 and, at
the very least, failed to appoint a guardian ad litem for the children.
C. What is in a Name? When Legal Custody Converts to Permanent
Custody for Unrepresented Parents in Custody Removal
Hearings

As recognized by Justice O’Neill, “It is undisputed that parents are
appointed counsel in permanent-custody cases . . . It makes no sense
to deny parents that same right in legal custody cases . . . In both
cases, the parents’ fundamental right to raise their own children is
being abrogated.”147 The Third District, however, emphasized that
the great-grandparents “were not given permanent custody of B.B.
and D.B., but rather a grant of legal custody.”148 The right to
counsel, however, should not turn on the civil label attached.
Permanent custody is defined as “a legal status that vests in a
public children services agency or a private child placing agency, all
parental rights, duties, and obligations . . . and divests the natural
parents or adoptive parents of all parental rights, privileges, and
obligations, including all residual rights and obligations.”149 On the
other hand, legal custody is “a legal status that vests in the custodian
the right to have physical care and control of the child . . . all subject
to any residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities.”150
“The important distinction” for the Third District was that “an
award of legal custody does not divest parents of their residual
parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities.”151 In contrast, a
parent cannot regain custody of a child after a trial court has awarded
permanent custody of that child to a public children services agency
or a private child placing agency. It is the permanent nature of this
loss of a fundamental right that makes it appropriate to equate an
award of permanent custody to the “death penalty in a criminal
case.”152 Yet, read in conjunction with the statute governing the
disposition of abused, neglected, or dependent children, 153 Ohio’s
legislature intended for even legal custody to be permanent.
146. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *8 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014), rev. denied,
11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014).
147. In re B.B., 11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014).
148. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *6.
149. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.011(B)(32) (West 2014) (emphasis added).
150. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.011(B)(21) (West 2014) (emphasis added).
151. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *6 (internal citations omitted).
152. In re B.C., 21 N.E.3d 308, 313 (Ohio 2014) (citing In re Smith, 601 N.E.2d 45, 55 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1991)).
153. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(A)(3)(b) (West 2014).
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Ohio Senate Bill 238, for example, specifically permitted a child
protection agency to file a complaint requesting legal custody be
granted to a person other than the person from whom the child is
being removed.154 Moreover, the identified legal custodian must sign
a statement of understanding “that legal custody of the child in
question is intended to be permanent.”155 The legal distinction
between permanent custody and legal custody, therefore, is
“susceptible of different interpretations.”156
Illustrating this point, the great-grandparents in In re B.B.
requested termination of visitation altogether between the children
and both parents, and the trial court ordered that the father have no
contact with his children.157 Applying Justice Blackmun’s dissent in
Lassiter, the great-grandparents’ “aim [thus was] not simply to
influence the parent-child relationship, but to extinguish it.”158 In this
circumstance, loss of even legal custody certainly resembles an
indeterminate prison sentence. An award of permanent custody to a
children services agency, therefore, may not be the only type of
custody award which—in effect—terminates parental rights.
While the restraint placed upon one’s superior parental right
theoretically is not as great as the severance of that right, when legal
custody becomes a permanent placement—and when visitation rights
are terminated as in In re B.B.—it is. Moreover, because no child
placement agency was involved in In re B.B., alternative procedural
safeguards, described by the United States Supreme Court in
Turner,159 and echoed by the Ohio Supreme Court in Liming160 and
In re B.C.,161 arguably are absent. For instance, no permanency
planning guidelines for visitation or reunification existed, nor the
requirement to appear back before the court for follow up or
monitoring, nor were the best interests of the children reviewed by a
154. See S. 238, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2006), available at
http://archives.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText126/126_SB_238_EN_N.pdfhttp://archives.legislature.stat
e.oh.us/BillText126/126_SB_238_EN_N.pdf; OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, REVISED FINAL ANALYSIS
21 (Sep. 21, 2006), available at http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/analyses126/06-sb238-126.pdfhttp://
www.lsc.state.oh.us/analyses126/06-sb238-126.pdf; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(A)(3).
155. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353(A)(3)(b) (emphasis added); see also S. 238, 126th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2006).
156. State ex rel. McQueen v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate Div., 986 N.E.2d
925, 930 (Ohio 2013).
157. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *2, *3 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014), rev.
denied, 11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014).
158. Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 39 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
159. See generally discussion of Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011), supra notes 28
and 29 and accompanying text.
160. See Liming v. Damos, 979 N.E.2d 297, 309 (Ohio 2012); supra text accompanying note 98.
161. See In re B.C., 21 N.E.3d 308, 312, 315 (Ohio 2014); supra text accompanying note 79.
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Foster Care Review Board or investigated by a Court Appointed
Special Advocate (CASA) volunteer.162
Significantly, although the Turner Court did not find that the Due
Process Clause guaranteed “the provision of counsel where the
opposing parent or other custodian . . . is not represented by
counsel,”163 the great-grandparents in In re B.B., in contrast, filed
their petition by and through counsel.164 Although a child support
matter, the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Turner
extends to In re B.B, because B.B.’s and D.B.’s parents faced a
represented opponent in court and lost custody of their children.165
The magistrate in In re B.B. should have balanced this inequity in
favor of appointing counsel.
According to the Third District, however, “at any time in the
future, either parent may petition the trial court for a modification of
custody.”166 Yet, the Ohio statute controlling custody modifications
and children’s best interests167 effectually prohibits a court from
returning custody to the parents in In re B.B. unless the parents can
prove that the great-grandparents no longer can provide a safe, stable
placement for B.B. and D.B. The statute directs that a court “shall
not modify” a prior custody decree unless it finds that “a change has
occurred in the circumstances of the child [or] the child’s residential
parent . . . and that the modification is necessary to serve the best
interest of the child.”168 The great-grandparents are the residential
parents of B.B. and D.B. Thus, the standard for returning custody of
the children to their natural parents, without the great-grandparents’
consent, requires more than B.B.’s and D.B.’s natural parents
showing a change in their own ability and desire to care for and
protect their children.169
162. This writer formerly worked as a juvenile court Family Services Officer, facilitated Foster
Care Review Boards, and served as a CASA volunteer at the Davidson County Juvenile Court in
Nashville, Tennessee. She writes from the lens of her previous experience in these roles.
163. Turner, 131 S.Ct. at 2520 (emphasis added).
164. See Mem. Supp. Jurisdiction, supra note 13, at 2.
165. Id.
166. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *6 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014), review
denied, 11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014) (referencing In re Hockstock, 781 N.E.2d 971, 979 (Ohio 2002));
see also In re Keylor, No. 04 MO 02, 2005 WL 775890, at *15 (Ohio 7th Dist. Ct. App. March 30,
2005) (DeGenaro, J., dissenting) (opining that an award of legal custody to a non-parent simply “limits
[a parent’s parental] rights until the parent can successfully demonstrate to a court that [he or she]
should regain custody.”) (emphasis in original).
167. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (West 2014).
168. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(E)(1)(a) (emphasis added).
169. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(E)(1)(a)(ii). But see In re Keylor, No. 04 MO 02,
2005 WL 775890, at *15 (Ohio 7th Dist. Ct. App. March 30, 2005) (DeGenaro, J., dissenting) (opining
that an award of legal custody to a non-parent simply “limits [a parent’s parental] rights until the parent
can successfully demonstrate to a court that [he or she] should regain custody.”).
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Moreover, the court severed all visitation between the father and
both children.170 Although B.B’s. and D.B.’s parents “may petition
the trial court for a modification of custody,”171 under the
circumstances—and in light of statutory directive172—reunification
seems unlikely. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that
“the natural rights of a parent are not absolute, but are always subject
to the ultimate welfare of the child . . . .”173
While an award of legal custody textually may limit a parent’s
rights174 until he or she can demonstrate to a court that custody
should be returned, considering the high standard and difficulty of
ever regaining custody,175 custody removal petitions—no matter how
couched—should trigger a parent’s right to court appointed counsel.
The distinction between legal custody and permanent custody, in this
sense, is illusory. In his dissent in Lassiter, Justice Stevens advances
one step further and opines that “the reasons supporting the
conclusion that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment entitles the defendant in a criminal case to
representation by counsel apply with equal force to a case of this
kind. The issue is one of fundamental fairness, not of weighing the
pecuniary costs against the society benefits.”176
IV. CONCLUSION

Ohio currently recognizes the right to counsel in civil custody
cases, but no right to court appointed counsel. Although the right to
counsel statute limits an indigent party’s entitlement to court
appointed representation,177 the statute’s wording does not foreclose
case-by-case attorney appointments at the court’s discretion.178
Because the Ohio Supreme Court has not decided the right to
appointed counsel in civil custody suits since its 1998 decision in
Asberry,179 which was superseded by statute in 2005,180 the issue
170. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *3.
171. Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
172. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(E)(1)(a).
173. In re B.C., 21 N.E.3d 308, 313 (Ohio 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted (citation
omitted).
174. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.011(B)(21).
175. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(E)(1)(a); supra note 167 and accompanying text.
176. Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 59-60 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
177. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § R.C. 2151.352.
178. See HOUSE CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW COMM., supra note 113 and accompanying text, at
Mar. 29, 1994 report (arguing that while there is no right to court appointed counsel in private
cases . . . “the [proposed] rule does not preclude counsel, but gives judges discretion.”)
179. 693 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio 1998), superseded by 2005 amendment to OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
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remains open to varying interpretations by Ohio’s lower courts.181
As applied to In re B.B., although court appointed counsel may not
have changed the outcome of the custody hearing,182 the United
States and Ohio Supreme Courts have recognized that due process is
“flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.”183 The parents and children in In re B.B. lacked
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to challenge the
juvenile court’s refusal to appoint counsel.184 Specifically, the
juvenile court’s no contact order terminated the father’s visitation
with his children.185 This should have triggered the right to
appointed counsel, or at the very least, a guardian ad litem for the
children, to ensure that the alternative procedural safeguards
recognized in Turner, Liming, and In re B.C. were satisfied.186 The
Third District thus applied an overly exacting analysis of Ohio
statutory law limiting the appointment of counsel in civil custody
suits when refusing to recognize a right to court appointed
representation for B.B., D.B., and their parents. The court’s decision
ignores more recent case law which champions balancing factors to
determine a violation of fundamental fairness, and which likely
would support court appointed representation for the parents and
children in In re B.B., as well as other future parties similarly
situated.
Ohio’s highest court “sits to settle the law, not to settle cases,” and
does not engage in an exercise in “‘error correction’ regarding the

§ 2151.352.
180. See H.R. 66, 126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) discussed at supra notes 42, 44,
and accompanying text.
181. See discussion of State ex rel. McQueen v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate
Div., 986 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ohio 2013), supra note 156 (finding that the issue was “susceptible of
different interpretations” by different courts).
182. See Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981) (holding
that the failure to appoint counsel does not presumptively deny the parent of constitutional rights where
the presence of counsel could not have made a determinative difference).
183. In re B.C., 21 N.E.3d 308, 312 (Ohio 2014) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972)).
184. See State ex rel. Asberry v. Payne, 693 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ohio 1998), superseded by 2005
amendment to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (finding that the grandmother “lacked an adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law to challenge [the juvenile court judge’s] refusal to appoint her
counsel” in the custody proceeding); State ex rel. McQueen v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas,
Probate Div., 986 N.E.2d 925, 931 (Ohio 2013) (recognizing that appellant “lacked an adequate remedy
in ordinary course of law to challenge the probate court’s refusal to appoint counsel for him.”).
185. In re B.B., Nos. 13-13-36, 13-13-37, at *3 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2014), review
denied, 11 N.E.3d 286 (Ohio 2014).
186. See generally discussion of Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011), supra notes 28
and 29; Liming v. Damos, 979 N.E.2d 297, 309 (Ohio 2012), supra note 98; and In re B.C., 21 N.E.3d
308, 312 (Ohio 2014), supra note 79.
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application of settled law to the facts of [a particular] case.” 187 In
addition to challenging the Third District’s flawed analysis in In re
B.B., this Comment highlights the unsettled application the Ohio’s
juvenile rules of court and statutory law controlling the appointment
of counsel in private party custody complaints, especially those
alleging dependency, abuse, and neglect. This Comment further
advocates that recent United States and Ohio Supreme Court
decisions concerning the appointment of counsel in other civil
contexts create a path for indigent litigants in private custody cases to
receive an attorney paid for by public funds. “If permanent custody
is the family law equivalent of the death penalty in criminal
cases[,and] legal custody is the equivalent of an indeterminate prison
sentence,”188 what alternative procedural safeguards currently are in
place for indigent Ohio parents in private action custody
proceedings?

187. Baughman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 727 N.E.2d 1265, 1276 (Ohio 2000) (Cook, J.,
concurring and citing Ohio Const. Art. IV, § 2).
188. In re Keylor, No. 04 MO 02, 2005 WL 775890, at *15 (Ohio 7th Dist. Ct. App. March 30,
2005) (DeGenaro, J., dissenting).
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